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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no doubt that nowadays data communication through networks has become an indis-
pensable infrastructure resource for our daily life and we get many benefits from it. However, 
increasing number of adherent network threats for business, governments, educational institu-
tions and other organizations imposes unexpected heavy risks to us.  
 
According to KSN data, Kaspersky Lab detected 1,347,231,728 threats in Q3 2012 and among 
which the total number of URLs serving malicious code was 91.9 million [1]. Those threats 
cause uncountable losses for not only the organizations but also individuals. In order to pro-
tect our information and assets, firewalls are used to protect against network-based attacks. A 
firewall is a device or software program used to control whether an incoming traffic or 
outgoing traffic could be passed or not according to the predefined security criteria [30]. In 
this way, it can provide security for the internal network by leaving potential threats outside 
the firewall and still let authorized users access the private network resources. There are vari-
ous types of firewalls such as a packet filtering firewall, a stateful inspection firewall and an 
application layer filtering firewall. All of them have been published and built by various fire-
wall vendors. 
 
Firewalls can be classified different ways. Classification can be based on cost such as com-
mercial and freeware, or be named according to implementation methods like hardware-based 
firewall and software-based firewall. We can also have dedicated hardware firewall and inte-
grated ones. 
 
In my thesis, I will analyze the performance of different firewall implementations and my 
practical study is comparing dedicated and integrated firewalls. In my final thesis, the 
dedicated firewall means it concentates on firewall functions no matter they are software 
based or hardware based firewall. Examples can be SmoothWall and Cisco ASA. While 
intergrated firewall here means a device has its own main responsiblity but it can be interated 
with some firewall features. For instance, the main job of a Cisco Router is routing but it can 
be a integrated firewall via inserting some firewall features. The theoretic aim of the thesis is 
to understand the firewall security mechanism, firewall history, advantages and limitations in 
different types of firewall technologies, and major firewall architetures. The more practical 
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purpose is to respectively implement firewall solution with Cisco IOS firewall (CBAC-
Router) and SmoothWall inside a Cisco router, then compare their related performances.  
 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an introduction of firewall 
security mechanism. Chapter 3 will cover the major types of firewall solution and 
comparisons between them. Chapter 4 will discuss common used firewall architectures. In 
Chapter 5, firewall implementation with CBAC-router and SmoothWall will be compared and 
analyzed. Network without firewall solution will be also included as reference in the lab work. 
Finally there will be a summary of the whole thesis.  
 
2. FIREWALL SECURITY MECHANISM 
 
In this chapter, I will firstly explain firewalls’ important roles in Internet security. Then I will 
simply summarize some basic and commonly used firewall security components such as ac-
cess control list, network address translation, and firewall authentication. 
 
2.1 Role of Firewalls in Internet security 
 
We live in an Internet-dependent era and the trend of Internet expansion continues to grow 
due to lager number of businesses using Internet as their sales and information channel. On 
the negative side, computer and network security issues are also growing. From Figure 1, we 
can obviously notice that with the tremendous growth trend, 83 million pieces of malware has 
already been discovered in March of 2012. And the continuingly worse situation is that new 
malware still occurs and topped at 7 million in the first quarter 2012. We do not know when 
the total number will top the 100 million but certainly that it will not be long. 
3 
 
Figure 1 McAfee Threats Report: First Quarter 2012 [2] 
 
Computer networks are vulnerable to many threats such as denial of service attacks, password 
guessing, protocol-based attacks, social engineering, war dialing and so on [3].  
 
Below are detailed explanations of the threats mentioned above [3]: 
 Denial of service attack: The attacker sends many requests to overwhelm a computer or 
network and in this way the valid users can not normally access or use the resources from 
the computer or the network.  
 Password guessing: Attackers use random combination of the characters and repeatedly 
tries the password. 
 Protocol-based attacks are method which takes advantage of protocols’ weakness. For 
example, DNS attack can be implemented by the attacker who makes the attaker’s device 
pretend to be the DNS server. Users who sends requests to the fake DNS server can re-
ceive data with malicious content.[29]  
 Social engineering: It means the attacker tricks users to reveal confidential information 
without letting users noticing being cheated. And then the attacker can make use of the 
4 
collected information to access the targeted system. Malicious attacker may make use of 
social means like Facebook to get needed information.  
 War dialing: Malicious people use some software to dial telephone numbers to search 
computers that provides a potential path towards a corporate network. Today the access is 
more often gained through unsecured wireless methods. Intentional attackers can bypass 
the firewall and intrusion detection system to access internal network resources.  
 
In addition, users’ lack of awareness in network security can also lead them to unintentionally 
access dangerous websites or reveal confidential information to potential hackers and then 
cause losses for them. Except teaching and training their network security knowledge, appro-
priate access controls on the firewall is needed to avoid attacks launched by professional 
hackers.   
 
Firewalls have been used for a long time and they can protect against some of the major at-
tacks mentioned above but not all unfortunately. By using firewalls, incoming and outgoing 
traffic can be restricted. This can help the organizations to make their resources only available 
to authorized parties and keep information in a private and secure way. If firewalls are used to 
monitor and limit connections to a network, hackers and unwanted programs have difficulties 
to invade your network or computer.  
 
In conclusion, even firewall cannot protect against all the threats, but they still play extremely 
important roles in almost every network.  
 
2.2 Firewall Characteristics 
 
No matter what kind of firewall vendors you choose or what kind of firewall solutions you 
implement for your network, there are some common rules or characteristics for firewalls 
mentioned below [4]: 
 All traffic from inside to outside or from outside towards inside must pass by the firewall. 
 Regardless of the firewall types you use and types of security policies you define on the 
firewall, only authorized traffic predefined by the local security policy will be permitted 
to pass. Traffic that is unmatched by the defined rules will be blocked. 
 Firewall is immune to penetration; this means that firewall uses a secure and trusted oper-
ating system. 
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2.3 Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
 
Access control list is a list of permit or deny statements defined in order and a statement is 
combined with information like IP addresses, port numbers and protocols [5]. ACLs can be 
used by network administrators to deny traffic or permit specific traffic in or out of the net-
works. As a result, using ACLs on the firewall for basic traffic filtering block unauthorized or 
potentially malicious packets towards the trusted network. As the devices I will use in the 
practical part of the thesis are Cisco products, the ACL rules are explained below using Cisco 
syntax. In this thesis, ACLs are Cisco related and may be a little different from other vendor’s 
ACLs settings. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of ALCs 
 
There are some common rules mentioned below for all kinds of Cisco ACLs and I will intro-
duce them in details later [5]: 
 One ACL per protocol. This means each ACL is applied to only one protocol rather than 
two or more protocols. 
 One ACL per direction. It means the traffic controlled by an ACL is in one directional 
either inbound or outbound at a time. It cannot apply an ACL in two directions at the 
same time. 
 One ACL per interface. This stands for each ACL only controls traffic for one interface. 
 ACL statements operate in sequential order. This means that the ACL statements are 
checked from top to bottom. If the incoming packet matches the first statement, then the 
remaining statements will not be checked. If there is no match, the packet will be exam-
ined by the next ACL statement until it matches or be dropped finally. As a result, it is 
better to put the most important rule at the top and then the second important one. 
 Final statement of the ACL is "implicit deny any statement", so an ACL should have at 
least one permit statement otherwise all traffic will be blocked. 
 
2.3.2 Types of Cisco ACLs 
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ACLs on Cisco IOS routers can be either named or numbered, standard or extended. Other 
complex ACLs are based on those ACLs. Named ACLs must be specified as either standard 
or extended. 
 
 Numbered ACLs 
Numbered ACLs are more effectively used to determine ACL type. ACLs with numbers from 
1 to 99 and from 1300 to 1999 are Standard IPv4 ACL, while range 100 to 199 and range 
2000 to 2699 belong to Extended IPv4 ACL. Below are details about types of ACLs [6] [31]: 
 
 Standard ACLs 
Standard ACLs allow a router or a firewall to permit or deny traffic only based on source IP 
addresses information. All other traffic which does not match the rule will be blocked as the 
implied "deny any" at the end of the ACL. This type of ACL is easy and fast to implement on 
devices to provide simple access control. However, rules are too simple and the checked in-
formation is in small limited range. As a result, traffic with malicious content but matching 
this rough rule can still pass the firewall. 
 
 Extended ACLs 
Extended ACLs filter IP packets according to many attributes like protocol types, source and 
destination IP address, source and destination TCP or UDP ports. Compared with Standard 
ACLs, it is more complex and therefore safer as more detailed information will be examined. 
Only packets matching all the attributes can be passed or denied. 
 
 TCP Established ACLs 
TCP Established ACLs were introduced in 1995. All the traffic from outside are not allowed 
to enter the inside network. This causes inconvenience for returning traffic that is initiated 
from the inside network. In addition, as many commonly used applications are based on TCP. 
A great deal of needed information using TCP is unavailable when returning traffic is blocked 
by the Extended ACLs. So TCP Established ACLs are introduced to still block all traffic com-
ing from Internet but to allow TCP reply traffic initiated from internal network. TCP Estab-
lished ACLs use the “established” keyword to force the router to check whether the TCP ACK 
or RST control flag is set or not. If the ACK flag is set, the TCP traffic will be allowed in. 
Otherwise traffic will be denied as the traffic will be deemed to associate with a new connec-
tion initiated by the outside network. 
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TCP Established ACLs are more complex than the two ACLs above but they are more flexible 
when provide same level of security for the network. However, the “established” parameter 
permits packets with the appropriate control flag setting on the TCP segment. The router does 
not keep track of conversations. Therefore, it cannot guarantee that all traffic coming from 
outside are initiated from the inside. Professional hackers can change the control flags and 
send malicious packets pretending as the returning traffic to the inside network. 
 
 Reflexive ACLs 
A reflexive ACL is a kind of session filter and it was introduced in 1996. Standard and ex-
tended ACLs do not keep track of the state of a connection. Reflexive ACL were developed to 
safely allow returning traffic back into internal network while block traffic originated from 
outside network according to session. It can be only defined with extended named IP ACLs 
rather than named ACLs or standard named IP ACLs. 
 
A reflexive ACL is safer compared to TCP Established ACL because more filter criteria must 
be matched before a packet is permitted. For example, spoofing and some types of denial of 
service attacks could be prevented by using reflexive ACL. In addition, the session filter is 
also temporary. This means that after the session is over, the filter will be removed. As a re-
sult, hackers have less opportunity to attack the network because of the limited time. 
 
 Dynamic ACLs 
Dynamic ACLs are also known as lock-and-key ACLs and are applied for IP traffic only. They 
are dependent on Telnet or SSH connectivity, authentication (local or remote), and Extended 
ACLs. Traffic wanting to pass through the router will be blocked first until the senders con-
nect the router by Telnet or SSH as well as being authenticated either locally or remotely. 
With dynamic ACLs, remote connectivity and resources access in a secure level between two 
remote networks are available. For example, a remote user A on the other side of the Internet 
can access to a host in a local network protected by a firewall and vice versa. 
 
One of the main advantages of the dynamic ACLs is that it uses the authentication mechanism 
to verify the users. It also makes the management process simpler in large internetworks be-
cause of local or remote authentication. Dynamic user access by the firewall reduces opportu-
nities of the network hacker and also does not need to compromise other security settings.  
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 Time-based ACLs 
Time-based ACLs were introduced in 1998 and had similar function of Extended ACLs. 
Time-based ACLs restrict traffic based on time range like number of hours, days, weeks or 
months and so on. This adds flexibility for the administrator to control the traffic or resource 
access according to the time. For example, employees can surf the Internet during the lunch 
time rather than the working time. It also simplifies network administrators’ workload on ana-
lyzing the logging messages in the peak time if they deny the traffic accordingly.  
 
 IPv6 ACLs 
IPv6 ACLs are introduced due to needs for IPv6 environment and increasing number of IPv6 
attacks. In this thesis, I will not cover details about IPv6 ACLs as lab work will be done in the 
IPv4 environment. 
 
2.3.3 Context-based Access Control (CBAC) ACLs 
 
CBAC is a software-based firewall feature that uses application layer protocol session infor-
mation to filter TCP and UDP packets. Like the reflexive ACLs which inspect traffic for ses-
sions that originates from outside, CBAC also inspects traffic from inside network. By track-
ing the connection status, a CBAC firewall can guarantee packets are not modified before en-
tering the network.  
 
A CBAC firewall could be classified as both stateful inspection firewall and application fire-
wall as it filters traffic at multiple layers such as network layer (IP addresses and protocols), 
transport layer (ports, TCP and UDP sessions), session layer (conversation state) and applica-
tion layer (protocols for specific applications). In the Cisco IOS Firewall solution, four main 
functions are provided by CBAC as follows [7]: 
 Traffic filtering: CBAC can inspect traffic according to sessions and permit specified 
TCP or UDP returning traffic initiated from the inside network. 
 Traffic inspection: CBAC inspects packet sequence numbers in TCP connections to see if 
they are within expected ranges and drops any suspicious packets. This helps protect 
against SYN-flood attack that means a network attacker floods a server with a large of 
connection requests while does not complete the connection. 
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 Intrusion detection: It can protect against specific SMTP attacks by reviewing syslog mes-
sage and monitoring specific attack signatures. 
 Generation of audits and alerts: Audit trails use syslog to track all network actions and 
timestamps while real-time alerts send syslog error messages to central console upon sus-
picious activity. 
  
Figure 2 CBAC operations [8] 
 
Figure 2 shows how CBAC operates when a user in protected network initiates an outbound 
connection to external network. 
 
2.4 Network Address Translation 
 
Network Address Translation (NAT) is the process of modifying IP address information in IP 
packet headers and changing it to another IP address on a routing device [9]. Most of the fire-
wall vendors use NAT in their firewalls not only because of conservation in IP address space 
but also to provide security. By hiding detailed information such as addresses of the protected 
network, network will be less likely attacked. 
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Figure 3 Network Address Translation [10] 
 
Figure 3 simply shows how NAT basically works. When host A with a private address 
172.16.0.10 in the internal network wants to connect to host B with a public address assigned 
by the ISP, a private IP address will be translated to a public IP address. In our case, source IP 
address 172.16.0.10 should be translated to 138.201.148.32 when packets pass cross the NAT 
router. Similarly, when host B replies to host A, 138.201.148.32 will be exchanged to 
172.16.0.10 by the NAT router [11].   
 
The NAT association can be either static as showed in Figure 3 or dynamic which contains IP 
addresses and ports number. NAT translates local private addresses into their associated pub-
lic addresses and vice versa. We can see from the above example that NAT acts as a bridge 
between your local network and the Internet. It makes all connections seem to be from the 
NAT address rather than from local addresses of the LAN computer. As a result of this, inter-
nal addresses and the network topology are invisible or hidden from outside. A firewall or a 
router with NAT feature can make the network less susceptible to be directly attacked and 
therefore reduce risks or threats for the organizations.  
 
However, there are also some disadvantages of the NAT. Due to the complexity of address 
exchanges, troubleshooting process will be more confusing and performance will be reduced 
because of the additionally consumed overhead by recalculating checksum. In addition, some 
protocols like IPSec (IP Security) are designed to detect modifications of the header [35]. As 
NAT changes the IP address, sometimes it is difficult to distinguish this change from mali-
cious data sending by a hacker. This may cause complexity and other security problems for 
the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) when they cannot 
work well with Network Address Translation (NAT) [12].  
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2.5 Demilitarized Zone  
 
Demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a physical or logical sub-network that contains and exposes an 
organization's external-facing services to a larger untrusted network, usually the Internet [13]. 
DMZ is commonly used with firewall. Basically, DMZ houses servers like an email server, a 
web server and a Domain Name System (DNS) server and those servers are usually exposed 
to the public network. DMZ isolates organizations’ internal network from the general public 
network where hackers may exist. Meanwhile, it also enables connections towards the DMZ 
from Internet and the corporates’ internal network. By limiting outsiders’ access only to the 
DMZ rather than the other parts of the corporates’ network, DMZ adds an additional network 
security for the internal network.  
 
There are two types of firewall with DMZ, one is single firewall the other is dual firewall. 
They will be introduced in the firewall architecture section.  
 
2.6 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
 
We may think packets inside the firewall network are roughly safe but once they are sent out 
they should be also safe. However, once the data is out of the firewall and towards the other 
remote network via the public network like Internet, how could the data still be protected? 
This issue requires that our firewall is not only controlling access of traffic but also be able to 
encrypt the outgoing traffic. Similarly, the firewall on the other side of public network should 
have the ability to decrypt the incoming traffic and filter unneeded traffic between the internal 
network and public network. The whole process is an example of Virtual Private Network 
(VPN).VPN is used to provide security for communications between two remote networks 
across public network like Internet [32]. VPN also involves encrypting and decrypting data, 
authenticating users and checking integrity.  
 
There are two types of VPN architectures, one is a remote access and the other is a site to site 
VPN. The remote access VPN also can be thought as a host to a gateway and a VPN gateway 
usually refers to a firewall or a router. The remote access VPN provides a secure connection 
between an individual host and a remote network. For example, a salesman who stays at home 
or travels outside the office can still access the company’s intranet resources by using the re-
mote access VPN. It needs the firewall administrator to define rules for the access. Only au-
12 
thorized users can gain access to the company and they are given limited rights by the network 
administrator to use the company resources. The site to site VPN is also called gateway to 
gateway. It enables users on different networks to communicate in a secure tunnel while other 
network users cannot share the resources. For example, employees at different branch offices 
can access resources between each site without limitation of separate locations. This model 
also needs authentication either by username and password or digital signatures. [32] 
 
Benefits of VPN are could be providing remote access in a secure way and allowing people to 
use intranet resources without limitations of the location. It also extends the private network 
via the virtual tunnels. However, there are also some disadvantages as follows. VPN is some 
part of the firewall and it usually adds additional workload to the firewall as well as consumes 
additional resources. Nowadays many firewalls have special hardware to support the VPN and 
minimize the negative impact of the VPN services. 
 
2.7 Firewall and Authentication 
 
We have the sense that authentication depends on verifying users’ identity such as username 
and password. However, as we know simple passwords are not reliable nowadays. Stronger 
authentication mechanisms are very important on firewalls when protocols such as Telnet, 
SSH are used. As I mention on the dynamic ACLs, when remote user establishes SSH or 
Telnet connection to the router, lock-and-key authentication could be used by a VTY line. 
This password based authentication can use different methods like password-only, a local 
username database or an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) server with 
either RADIUS or TACACS+.  
 
When AAA is implemented with Cisco products, either Terminal Access Control Access 
Control Server Plus (TACACS+) or Remote Authentication Dial-In User Services (RADIUS) 
can be selected. Both methods can be used by remote users when communicating with AAA 
servers. Differences are TACAS+ encrypt all information like passwords and usernames while 
RADIUS only encrypts user passwords. As a result, TACAS+ is more secure and it is sup-
ported by most Cisco products but RADIUS is the RFC standard. How to choose appropriate 
method depends on the organization’s needs. If detailed accounting is more important 
RADIUS maybe selected as it provides extensive accounting. If there are different user groups 
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in the organization and different authorization policies are applied, TACACS+ maybe selected 
as it separates authentication and authorization processes [17]. 
 
2.8 Cryptographic Security Mechanisms 
 
Common authentication methods in modern firewall are one time passwords, hashed pass-
words and digital signatures with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). As many security imple-
mentations including some firewall implementations are based on cryptographic mechanism, I 
will explain this topic a little bit. Cryptography consists of authentication, integrity and confi-
dentiality and protects data against exposed to untrusted parties. 
 
Figure 6 CIA [18] 
 
From Figure 6 we can see there are various protocols and algorithms for implementing confi-
dentiality, integrity and authentication. HMAC, RSA or DSA can be used in the authentication 
while integrity is guaranteed by using MD5 or SHA.  
 
Encrypting communication traffic is one example to secure the data confidentiality in fire-
walls. There are two types of encryption algorithms, one is symmetric and the other is asym-
metric. Symmetric algorithms like DES, 3DES and AES assume both communicating parties 
know the pre-shared key. While asymmetric algorithms like RSA and Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) establish a secure method without previously knowing the secret key. Choosing a 
suitable algorithm depends on the specific security needs. For example, MD5 is less safe but 
faster than SHA. In addition, encapsulating security payload (ESP) which offers confidentiali-
ty, integrity and authentication is widely used. Those security mechanisms used in the firewall 
can protect communications traffic to or from firewalls against modification, insertion or dele-
tion.  
 
3. TYPES OF FIREWALL TECHNOLOGIES 
 
When Morris Worm carried by emails firstly attacked Internet in a large scale without 
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expectation, Internet experts beagn to cooperate on designing secure software and systems for 
the Internet. Firewall began to emerge in late 1980s even Internet related things were still 
quite new to the majority of people all over the world. 
 
Firewall acts as a safe guard who stands in front of a building entrance and checks people who 
comes in or out to keep the building safe. This section will give a general overview of differ-
ent firewall technologies. Nowadays we have various kinds of firewalls which have common 
properties such as resistance to attacks. All traffic must flow through firewall and using access 
control policy. However, different types of firewall have different advantages and limitations. 
This mainly due to firewalls usually also contains other technologies such as network address 
translation, content filtering and so on. With a good understanding of their differences and 
their respectively provided features, we can choose and implement appropriate type of a fire-
wall to best meet the network security needs. 
 
3.1 Packet Filtering Firewall 
 
Packet filtering firewall is the first firewall technology introduced by Jeff Mogul from Digital 
Equipment Corporation (DEC) in 1988 [19]. This first generation of packet filtering firewall 
mainly works at the network layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. And it 
also uses transport layer information such as port numbers to deny or permit traffic (e.g. traffic 
sent by an outside web server to the TCP port 80 could be configured to be blocked).  
 
Packet filtering is based on using ACLs to block connenction to or from a specific network, 
hosts and ports. It filters traffic according to source and destination IP addresses, source and 
destination TCP/UDP port numbers, protocols and packet types. However, initial packet filter-
ing firewalls are stateless as they do not know whether a packet is a part of the existing traffic 
stream or not. As a result, this kind of firewall is also called stateless inspection firewall. Alt-
hough fewer stateless firewalls are used nowadays, they are indeed the core foundation of 
most modern and advanced firewalls. Content below are advantages and limitations of the 
first generation packet filtering firewall.  
 
Advantages of stateless packet filtering firewall are [19]: 
 Location flexibility: network devices like routers, switches, and wireless access points 
configured with ACLs can be packet filtering firewall to control traffic for security [20]. 
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 Packet filters firewalls filter packets faster without inspecting packet content. 
 Packet filters have a low impact on network performance and work efficiently. 
 Packets filters are easy to implement (a network router with simple access control lists 
could be a simple packet filtering firewall), maintain, and are supported by most operating 
systems. 
 Security at the Network Layer can be provided by a packet filter. 
 A packet filter can perform almost all tasks of a high-end firewall at a much lower cost. 
 
Disadvantages of stateless packet filtering firewall are [19]: 
 Packet filter firewall is weak to IP spoofing. If hackers modify the IP address information 
in the packets header and send that packets pretending from a trusted network to the fire-
wall; and packets fitting the ACL criteria can pass. If those passed packets contain mali-
cious code, the internal network will be in high risk. Some spoofing attacks can be miti-
gated by verifying the session state in a firewall that works at higher layers. Authenticat-
ing the users before allowing the packets is also an effective way to prevent IP spoofing. 
 Packets filter firewall may be vulnerable to Overlapping Fragment Attack which is to 
bypass the firewall and gain access to the targeted network or a host. Because packet fil-
ters filter fragmented IP packets based on the TCP header information in the first frag-
ment and all fragments after the first fragment are passed unconditionally. Attacker can 
overwrite part of the TCP header information in the first fragmentation which can still 
pass the firewall. Then following fragments can be inserted with malicious data and pass 
the firewall. Common example is to change service type by changing the destination port 
number. For example, change port 25 (SMTP) to port 23(Telnet), traffic normally will be 
denied by the router could pass the packet filtering firewall in this case [21]. Firewalls can 
be configured to block fragmented packets to mitigate the fragment attack. However 
fragment packets sent by the legitimate users via the Internet could be blocked as well, so 
it is not recommend. 
 Packet filter firewalls cannot dynamically filter certain services. For example, sessions 
that use dynamic port negotiations are difficult to filter without opening access to a whole 
range of ports. 
 Packet filter firewalls are stateless. They examine each packet header rather than content 
showing the state. Anything even like viruses fitting the simple rules can pass and sender 
of packet is not authenticates, which will cause security issues. 
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 Packet filtering firewall cannot resist the attacks on application layer as it does not check 
the packets’ contents. 
 
3.2 Stateful Inspection Firewall 
 
Stateless packet filtering also known as static packet filtering cannot recognize whether the 
packet is part of an existing flow of data or not. Allow or deny decisions are made packet by 
packet basis rather than based on previous allowed or denied packets. As result, a stateless 
packet filtering firewall is not smart enough and can be fooled by professional hackers. To 
solve this problem, stateful inspection firewall was firstly developed by Bill Cheswick and 
Steve Bellovin at AT&T Bell Laboratories in 1989 [22].  
 
Stateful inspection firewalls are based on packet filtering firewall and can monitor the connec-
tion state such as initiation, data transfer and termination. To point out that, the terms to de-
scribe the connection state may be a little different from various firewall products but quite 
similar. This kind of firewall is also known as dynamic packet filtering firewall and it uses 
information at layer 3, 4 and 5 of the OSI model. [22] 
 
Stateful inspection firewalls track the communication process by using a state table. Naturally, 
about the firewalls’ state table may also vary from a vendor to a vendor. Following 
information is about the Cisco stateful firewall’s state table. Every time when a TCP or UDP 
connection is established, a firewall will log information in the stateful session flow table. The 
session flow table includes sorce and destination addresses, port numbers, TCP sequencing 
information and flags for TCP or UDP connection in each associated session. When firewall 
receives a packet from outside network, it will compare the received packets with saved state 
table information to make the allowed or denied decisions [22]. In addition, for stateful in-
spection firewalls who add the network address translation (NAT) feature, their state tables 
will also include some NAT information [32].  
 
More advanced stateful inspection firewalls can update state the table and allow returning 
traffic initiated from inside network. This reduces DNS cache poisoning (which could cause 
the name server to return incorrect address and make the attackers’ device acts as DNS server 
to trick users communicate with them) and TCP RST flood attacks (a kind of DOS attack by 
sending succession of SYN requests to targeted systems and cause server unresponsive to le-
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gitimate users) [23]. However, as stateful inspection offers transparency, internal IP addresses 
are exposed as shown in Figure 7 below. This could cause potential threats for the network. 
 
Figure 7 Stateful Inspection Firewall [24] 
 
Below are some advantages of the stateful inspection firewall [22]: 
 Provide more secure and better performance than packet filtering firewall.  
 Stateful packet filtering firewall can prevent some spoofing and DoS attacks by inspecting 
connection state or verifying whether packets from an authorized source or not. 
 
Disadvantages of the stateful inspection firewall are listed below [22]: 
 Compared with stateless firewalls, stateful inspection firewall requires more memory to 
track the connection state. 
 It is also harder to manage than a stateless firewall 
 Stateful packet filtering is vulnerable to application layer attacks as it doesn’t check con-
tents of the connection. 
 Some connectionless protocols like UDP and ICMP do not produce connection infor-
mation for the state table. They are quite different form connection-oriented TCP who has 
the three-way handshake process. UDP and ICMP packets do not have sequence number 
or flags, so stateful inspection firewalls can just check the source and destination IP ad-
dress, ports and other information according to the rules to allow the packets. What is 
more, because of UDP and ICMP are connectionless; firewall cannot know when the ses-
sion is end. So the UDP or ICMP session’s entries will be removed from the state table 
when the predefined timeout value is reached. This prevents entries from filling the state 
table and may let some UDP or ICMP traffic pass the firewall without entries. [32] [33] 
 Stateful inspection firewall doesn’t support user authentication. 
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3.3 Application Layer Filtering Firewall 
 
With development of the attacking methods, threats move from lower layers to the higher lay-
ers like application layer. As we know from above, a packet filtering firewall and a stateful 
inspection firewall analyze a packet’s addresses, ports, protocols, or a packet state but still not 
that deep in application protocols and content of the packets. Absence in checking contents 
including payload gives hackers opportunities to attack the application layer directly. So the 
third generation of the firewall called application layer filtering firewall is invented to defend 
application layer attacks.  
 
Application layer filtering firewall filters traffic based on information on layers 3, 4, 5 and 7 
of the OSI model. Application level firewall can examine contents of the header information 
according to specific keywords or character strings like words or phrases and then block mes-
sages matching the rules [25]. Most of the application firewalls control and filter traffic based 
on software. This means that the application firewall filters content and blocks unwanted traf-
fic with the help of software program.  
  
Advantages of the application layer filtering firewall are listed as follows: 
 Provide higher level security when compared with other types of firewall. Application 
layer filtering firewall examines content of the data, so it can prevent attacks based on ap-
plication layer protocols. Examples are SMTP, POP3 and DNS buffer overflows; web 
attacks based on HTTP header and request information; attack code hidden with SSL 
tunnels[25]. For a detiled example like web based attacks, we can use keyword ”aaa” 
specified by the firewall to filter URL http://www.badthings.com/aaa.html. 
 
Disadvantage of the application layer filtering firewall are showed as below [25]: 
 A main shortcut of the application firewall is that the processing is slow due to checking 
contents of the packets. As a result, network performance may be degraded in certain de-
gree.  
 Application firewall needs support from powerful hardware when compared with packet 
filtering firewall. 
 In addition, it is more expensive than the other types of firewall. 
 The last disadvantage is its complexity and relatively difficult to implement and maintain.  
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3.4 Other kinds of Firewalls 
 
Except firewalls I mention above, there are also other kind of firewalls such as host-based 
firewall and hybrid firewalls in modern networks. Those firewalls add flexibility and diversity 
to the network according to different specification and needs.  
 
3.4.1 Host-based Firewall 
 
Host-based (server and personal) firewall means a host or server with firewall software run-
ning on it. Perimeter-based firewalls have to deal with large number of applications and ser-
vices. Sometimes it is possible for them to leave out some malicious threats which access into 
the internal network. And it is widely known that perimeter-based firewalls don’t protect 
against threats inside the network. So a host-based firewall can be used to prevent threats 
mentioned before. It can block incoming or outgoing traffic but only on that host or server and 
not the network it resides [28]. With the firewall software, host can be less likely affected by 
malware or other hosts. Host-based firewalls for servers usually use rule sets to deny or allow 
traffic like the network firewall does. Host-based firewall also cooperates with other software 
like antivirus software and intrusion prevention software to provide security. 
 
3.4.2 Distributed Firewall 
 
Except the personal firewall, more advanced firewall like a distributed firewall is developed to 
prevent inside network attacks. Unlike a traditional firewall that assumes the internal network 
is trusted while the external network is untrusted, a distributed firewall thinks both internal 
and external network are untrusted [26]. By filtering traffic from both the Internet and inside 
network, attacks launched from the inside network can be prevented.  
 
A distributed firewall is based on host-resident software applications, and it can provide high-
ly targeted security policy for the hosts which run specific applications. A distributed firewall 
is usually behind the perimeter firewall and acts as the second screen. Like a big building 
within many rooms, perimeter firewall acts as the main guard in the building entrance and 
distributed firewall provides features that act as guard in the room entrance.  
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Distribution firewall is not a single product but an entire system that has a perimeter firewall, 
a central management server, and end-user machines. There are three main components of the 
distributed firewall. The first one is the central management system which centrally deploys, 
monitors, or updates security policies. The central management feature reduces workload for 
the administrator and also reduces costs on maintance. The second component is to distribute 
the policies to end-users in a secure way. Finally, when security polies sent by the central 
management server arrive to the hosts, hosts will implement the polies to allow or deny 
traffic. [26]  
 
A distributed firewall is similar to personal firewall but it has more advantages as it offers 
central management, logging and other features [26]. Security policy on the personal firewall 
can be configured by the system users themselves and the policies or management is only val-
id on that individual host. Security policies on end-users within the distributed firewall are 
managed by the network administrator. And those security polices cannot be changed by the 
client users. Security policy could be implemented on every detailed corner of the network 
where the distributed firewall resides rather than just generally between networks.  
 
In summary, the distributed firewall strengthens system security in terms of intrusion detec-
tion and intrusion protection systems for the hosts. By implementing comprehensive security 
policy on the hosts, inside attacks can be prevented. Central management also enhances 
network administrators’s work efficiency. In addition, it reduces bottleneck problem on the 
perimeter firewall and improves network performance like faster processing speed. Network 
monitoring, syslog management and other tools also enhance the security level.  
 
3.4.3 Application Proxy Gateway 
 
A proxy server can also acts as a firewall to allow or deny packets and works on behalf of the 
network users. It can be a dedicate hardware or a general machine running some software. 
Proxy is a special network service used by clients to indirectly connect to another host. Many 
firewalls and routers have this kind of proxy function to provide privacy and security for pro-
tected network. 
 
Firewalls that have a proxy agent act as a bridge between the internal network and Internet. 
When host A in the internal network wants to communicate with host B via the Internet, it 
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should firstly connect to the proxy server and then the proxy server connects to the host B. 
Both host A and host B are invisible to each other but they are respectively visible to the 
proxy server. They never communicate directly but always via proxy server. As host B on the 
external network cannot see the inside IP addresses, the internal network is less likely to be 
attacked by the hacker. This is quite similar to the network address translation.  
 
The proxy agent uses the firewall rules to deny or allow traffic. There are different types of 
proxy gateways or proxy firewalls according to which layer they mainly operate. 
 
An application proxy gateway is similar to an application firewall and works at the application 
layer. It also examines the content of the traffic and checks application protocol headers or 
payloads to allow or deny traffic. There are some differences between the application proxy 
gateway and the application firewall. Firstly, the application proxy gateway is safer as it pre-
vents direct connection between two hosts [32]. Secondly, it provides safer mechanism like 
decrypting, and re-encrypting packets before sending them [32].  
 
There are different dedicated application proxy servers according to different protocols. 
And different dedicated proxy servers provide different services. For example, a HTTP proxy 
server provides web services and a Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) proxy server pro-
vides email services. Normally, a proxy server is placed behind a firewall and deals with traf-
fic to or from the main firewall. Before forwarding traffic to the internal hosts or passing traf-
fic to the firewall, the proxy server will check and filter the traffic [32]. Dedicated proxy serv-
ers only accept packets generated by the service that the proxy server dedicates [27]. For ex-
ample, Telnet traffic is only handled by the Telnet proxy [27]. An application proxy gateway 
that only runs Telnet proxy can allow packets generated with Telnet service and deny all other 
packets with other services. Dedicated proxies can reduce workload for the firewall as it can 
filter and log some application traffic that maybe hard to check for the firewall [32]. 
 
There are some disadvantages of the application proxy firewall, it is more difficult and com-
plex to configure. For the dedicated application proxy, an administrator should be familiar 
with the protocols to configure related security policies. Otherwise, misconfiguration would 
negatively affect the network security level. In addition, the processing speed is slow and the 
performance is degraded. 
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Because of those problems, application proxy servers are gradually ignored by many vendors 
and replaced by adaptive proxies like Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). Adaptive 
proxy firewalls combine security of the proxy firewall and speed of the dynamic packet fire-
wall as well as other features. 
 
3.4.4 Unified Threats Management (UTM) 
 
Many modern firewalls are combined with several features to apply on a single device or sin-
gle system. Similarly, Unified Threats Management (UTM) also adapts the idea to integrate 
multiple security products to perform multidimensional security features on a single appli-
ance. For example, it usually combines firewall, anti-virus, network intrusion detection and 
other features. 
 
With those all-inclusive security features, organizations especially small and medium size 
organizations can save money when buying devices. UTM also reduces the complexity and 
simplifies installation as well as maintenance of the device. Web-based GUI management also 
reduces workload of the network administrator. As every coin has two sides, one main limita-
tion of the UTM is the performance. With a single device and single system to deal with mul-
tiple tasks will take longer time and consumes CPU resources. As a result, the processing may 
be slower and it needs support of powerful hardware. When compared with some single fea-
ture provided by an individual device, the performance of that feature on UTM may also de-
grade because of compromising with other multiple functions. [32] 
 
4 FIREWALL AND NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
 
After we now know secure components in firewalls and types of firewalls, it is time to analyze 
where we should put the firewall in the network topology. This section is mainly to introduce 
commonly used firewall architectures in the network. 
 
4.1 Simple Network with Firewall or Bastion Host  
 
In Chapter 3 we already learnt that packet filtering is the basic feature of a firewall and devic-
es like router can also acts as simple firewall. Below Figure 8 shows a simple packet filtering 
router acting as a firewall between a trusted network (private network) and an untrusted net-
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work (public network like Internet). The router is directly connected to both networks to pro-
vide simple network security features. You can apply different types of Cisco IOS ACLs to 
control network access.  
 
Figure 8 A Simple Router as a Firewall [36] 
 
4.2 Firewall with Proxy Server 
 
As Internet is an open system, sometimes we do not want to reveal our internal network. We 
can use a proxy server as a “fog screen” on the network to minimize exposed connection to 
the Internet. 
 
Figure 9 Proxy Server [38] 
 
Figure 9 shows network topology with a proxy server. Hosts in the LAN want to communicate 
with outside world and packets should be processed by the proxy before being forwarded to 
the Internet. Similarly, returning packets from the Internet should also be processed by the 
proxy server before sending them to the internal host. A router in the network acts as a fire-
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wall and can control network access by utilizing access lists. Except allowing and denying 
traffic to a network, router also routes IP packets.    
 
4.3 Firewalls with DMZ  
 
We learnt in Section 2.5 that DMZ is a subnet network to place servers and it also separates 
the internal network from the public network. No matter how to implement a network with 
DMZ, basic access control principles are as follows [14]: 
 Internal network can freely access the Internet but this needs the firewall to translate in-
ternal source addresses to the public one. 
 Internal network can access the DMZ; this makes convenience for internal users adminis-
trate the servers in DMZ as well as share resources provided by the DMZ servers. 
 External network can access the DMZ as primary aim of the servers in DMZ is to provide 
services for the public network. Additionally, when outsiders access the DMZ, the fire-
wall needs to translate public address to address recognized in the DMZ. 
 External network cannot access the internal network as data in the internal network is 
private and not public. 
 DMZ cannot access the internal network otherwise when hackers from Internet intrudes 
DMZ, they can attack the internal network in further. 
 Generally, DMZ cannot access the Internet except when DMZ houses email server which 
needs to access the Internet. 
 
Below are two types of firewall architectures within the DMZ implantation.  
25 
 
Figure 4 Single Firewall [15] 
 
Figure 4 shows the single firewall topology. There is only one firewall with three network 
interfaces which respectively connect the external network, DMZ and internal network. Any 
communications between servers in different zones must pass through the firewall under the 
predefined network security policies. 
 
 
Figure 5 Dual Firewall [15] 
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Figure 5 shows a more secure way to create a DMZ with two firewalls. The first firewall (also 
called front-end firewall) connects the DMZ and public network. It is configured to allow traf-
fic destined to the DMZ only. The second firewall (also called back-end firewall) connects 
internal network and DMZ. It controls traffic between internal network and DMZ. This meth-
od is more secure as hackers have to break two firewalls in order to access the internal net-
work but it is also more expensive.  
 
4.4 Firewall Appliance 
 
A firewall appliance can be dedicated hardware and software system that implements the ac-
cess control policy. It can contain many features like Network Address Translation (NAT), 
Virtual Private Network (VPN), and De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) and so on. Cisco ASA is 
one of the commonly used Firewall Appliance for small and medium size organizations. Fig-
ure 10 shows a simple topology of the Firewall Appliance. 
 
Figure 10 Firewall Appliances [36] 
 
4.5 Firewall with VPN 
 
As I mention in Section 2.6, VPN is added to the modern firewall architecture to provide se-
cure connection for two remote networks over the Internet. Basically, there are two types of 
VPN networks, one is site-to-site VPN and the other is remote access VPN.  
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Figure 11 Site-to-site VPN [39] 
 
As mentioned earlier, a site-to-site VPN solution can connect two or more sites in different 
fixed locations in a secure way. By using site-to-site VPN, an organization with different 
branch offices can extend its network and internal information resources to its employees. In 
the site-to-site VPN network, hosts on each side of the network send and receive traffic 
through the VPN gateway. A VPN gateway is usually placed at the edge of a network and it 
can be a router, a firewall or Cisco ASA.  
 
Figure 11 shows how the site-to site VPN works. If host A in the network 1 wants to com-
municate to host B on network 2 via the Internet, it firstly sends traffic to VPN gateway A. 
Then the VPN gateway A will encrypt the traffic before sending it to the Internet. When the 
peer VPN gateway, which is VPN gateway B on the network 2 receives the traffic; it will first 
decrypt the traffic and then forwards the traffic to host B. [40]  
 
 
Figure 12 Remote Access VPN [based on 39] 
 
Site-to-site VPN is suitable for network to network connections and the places of the networks 
are usually fixed. However, how to provide a secure solution for cases that VPN users change 
their locations frequently? For example, some business man like salesman who needs to travel 
to different places but still need to access information from the remote company via the Inter-
net.  
 
In this case, remote access VPN is developed for those telecommuters. They can flexibly con-
nect VPN connection by the computer without limitation of the location. In addition, they do 
not need to set up the VPN connection all the time and can close the connection when unnec-
essary and establish the connection when needed.  
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Remote-access VPN could be implemented as client and server architecture and usually the 
client should download corresponding VPN client software. The VPN client software acts as 
the VPN gateway as I mention tin the site-to-site VPN. When client sends traffic, VPN client 
software will encrypt and encapsulate the traffic before sending it to the Internet. When the 
VPN gateway on the target network receives the traffic, it decrypts the traffic like the VPN 
gateway in the site-to-site VPN. [40] 
 
5. FIREWALL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
After we get familiar with the firewall technology and architecture, it is time to do the practi-
cal firewall implementation. A firewall can be a simple device like a router with integrated 
firewall capabilities. It can also be a dedicated firewall like the SmoothWall to provide some 
security features. My practical aim in this section is to implement application layer filtering 
based on two different firewall solutions. They are a Cisco IOS router configured with CBAC, 
and a firewall as a proxy by using SmoothWall. Then I will compare the performance differ-
ences between them. 
 
To analyze their performance, I will use a network connected by a router but without any 
firewall capabilities as a reference. For each test, I will choose ICMP, TCP and UDP traffic to 
test whether the traffic is allowed before or after I configure related rules. In this basic testing 
environment, I will also choose referred parameters on TCP traffic for evaluating bandwidth. 
Topics about my testing environment, performance comparisons among different firewall im-
plementations, and conclusion or additional analysis summary for the practical work will be 
covered below.  
 
5.1 Cisco Router without Firewall Capabilities  
 
In my practical work, I simplify the network topology by only using two networks. One net-
work stands for the trusted network and the other one represents the untrusted network. Only 
one firewall will be used and I will not use DMZ in the network. The four testing environ-
ments and details are shown below. 
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5.1.1 Tested Environment 
 
Before we evaluate the firewall performance, it is extremely importmant to test its baseline 
environment. This guarantee that the firewall performance will not be affected by the other 
factors in the baseline and make the results more reliable. The other purpose of the baseline 
environment is to decide measurement methods and referenced parameters for latter scenerios.  
 
Figure 13 shows the toplogy of the small baseline network. Two computers with Windows XP 
and one Cisco 2911 router will be used. Server computer will stand in the outside network 
while Client computer will be placed in the inside network. 
 
 
Figure 13 Basic Tested Environment 
 
Table 1 shows ip addresses and subnet masks of the network devices according to the 
topology.  
 
Table 1 Address Plan 
Name IP Address Subnet mask Gateway 
Server 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1 
Client 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.1 
Outside Interface 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 NO 
Inside Interface 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 NO 
 
I test ICMP, TCP and UDP traffic before I measure the network performance by sending echo 
request, web request and TFTP file transfer request. I ping from the client computer to the 
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server computer and vice versa, both pings are successful. Then I use a web browser on the 
client computer and type the IP address of server computer to test the TCP traffic. The client 
computer can successfully access to the homepage of the server computer and vice versa.  
 
Finally, to test the UDP traffic, I download tftpd32 software on both server computer and cli-
ent computer. On the server computer, I firstly open the tftpd32 software and choose TFTP 
Server. Then on the client computer, I create some text file which will be transferred during 
the test. Figure 14 shows the content of the text file I will transfer and configuration of the 
client TFTP. Firstly, I open the software and choose the TFTP client to send TFTP file. Host 
is the IP address of the server on which the TFTP server is installed. The port number is 69 
and the protocol is UDP. Then I locate the test1 text file and click the Put button. We can see 
the settings on the TFTP client and text file content from Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14 TFTP Client Configurations 
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Then the TFTP server will receive the text file and we can see it on the directory. Figure 15 
shows that the TFTP Server receives the text file and we can also see the content of the 
received file. 
 
Figure15 Results on TFTP server  
 
In summary, all the traffic like TCP, UDP and ICMP are verified normal before I measure the 
network performance. 
 
5.1.2 Network Performance Measurement Methods  
 
After the basic environment is tested, network performance will respectively be evaluated by 
network latency and packet lost rate. Bandwidth will also be used as a reference of the net-
work performance. Then based on the results, I can choose referred parameters for other fire-
wall implementations and compare or analyze the results of the tests.  
 
5.1.2.1 Network Latency and Packet Lost Rate  
 
I simply use ping command to test the network latency and packet lost rate. Here the network 
latency will use Round-trip Time (RTT) as a reference. The unit of RTT is millisecond and I 
will use the ms as its abbreviation. In general, three different packet sizes like small, medium 
and large will be used. For each packet size, I will test 5 times and for each time I send 500 
ICMP requests. Then I calculate the average RTT, average of the minimum RTT and average 
maximum RTT as well as average of packet lost rate according to the results of the 5 tests. 
  
Among the 5 tests, the result of the each test mostly varies a little different in terms of maxi-
mum RTT when one or two ICMP requests among the 500 requests take longer time. Usually, 
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the number of those packets is few. As a result, the average RTT is almost same to the mini-
mum RTT when majority of the packets use the minimum RTT.  
 
Table 2 Network Latency and Packet Lost Rate 
 
Table 2 shows that in the base environment with same number of requests, the bigger the 
packet size the larger dealy will the network has. Packet lost rate will also increase 
correspondingly when the packet size grows. In each case of packet size, the average value is 
equal to the minimum value. This means that only few ICMP requests have higher RTT. 
 
5.1.2.2 Bandwidth 
 
To measure the network bandwidth, I download Jperf software on two computers. I will use 
Jperf server on the Server computer and the client mode on the Client computer. TCP with 
different parameters will be tested individually. For the TCP traffic, buffer length, TCP win-
dow size and Max Segment Size will be separately set with different values to determine 
which value has higher bandwidth. Then I will choose a good combination of those three fac-
tors in other tests.  
 
Firstly for the TCP Buffer length test, I use the following ascending buffer sizes 1Mbytes, 2 
Mbytes, 4 Mbytes, 8Mbytes, 16Mbytes and 32 Mbytes. 
 
 
Packet size 
(Bytes) 
Number of 
Requests 
Lost Min (ms) Max (ms) Average (ms) 
32 500 0 (0%) 0 0.8 0 
35000 500 1.1 (0%) 7 8.4 7 
65000 500 2.6 (0%) 13 21.8 13 
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Figure 16 TCP Buffer Size and Bandwidth  
 
From Figure 16 above, we can see that with lower buffer size, the bandwidth is more stable 
with relatively lower value like 83886 Kbytes. If the buffer size is higher, bandwidth will fluc-
tuate and change more dramatically if the buffer size is more than 16 Mbytes. As a result, I 
will choose 1 Mbytes for the buffer size to get a stable bandwidth result for the later tests. 
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Then for the TCP window size, I use different window sizes. Table 3 shows that the band-
width will gradually become bigger when the window size grows until it exceeds 32 Kbytes. 
After 32 Kbytes, bandwidth will decrease a little bit. According to the result, I will use 32 
Kbytes as a reference value for the TCP window size.  
 
Table 3 TCP Window Size and Bandwidth 
Window 
size 
(Kbytes) 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 
Bandwidth 
(Kbits/sec) 
57584 57576 58638 62538 71974 84687 84581 84123 
 
Thirdly, for the TCP Max Segment Size (MSS), I also use varied values ranged from 300 
Kbytes to 1800 Kbytes to show the trend of bandwidth when MSS grows. Table 4 shows that 
bandwidth will become bigger when MSS grows until its value is 1500 Kbytes. If the MSS 
value is over 1500 Kbytes, bandwidth will decrease a little bit. Based on the results, I will 
choose 1500 Kbytes as the referred MSS for TCP traffic. 
 
Table 4 TCP MSS and Bandwidth 
MSS 
(Kbytes) 
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 
Bandwidth 
(Kbits/sec) 
57805 51823 61884 62097 62277 61917 
 
In summary, for the TCP traffic, bandwidth will be set by buffer size with 1 Mbytes, window 
size with 32 Kbytes and MSS with 1500 Kbytes. With those settings configured for the TCP 
traffic, I test 5 times and use the average value for bandwidth in the baseline environment of 
router without firewall. Table 5 shows that the bandwidth in this testing environment is 84348 
Kbits/sec. 
 
Table 5 TCP Bandwidth in Router without Firewall 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Bandwidth 84394 84336 84498 84336 84175 84348 
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(Kbits/sec) 
 
5.2 IOS Router configured with CBAC 
 
In this section, Cisco router will be configured with CBAC feature and acts as an integrated 
firewall to control traffic between two networks. In this CBAC settings, the inside interface 
will be configured with inbound ACLs to inspect outgoing traffic. And the outside interface 
will be set with dynamic ACLs to allow traffic originated from inside network to return back. 
This dynamic ACL is temporary and will be removed when the session is over. All the ACLs 
will be numbered and extended ACLs. 
 
 
Figure 17 Router with CBAC 
 
Figure 17 shows the topology of this tested network. I just continue to use the baseline net-
work and add extended ACLs on both inside and outside interface in order to control traffic. 
The network will be implemented with the aims below: 
 Client on inside network can send ICMP echo request 
 Client on inside network can access the homepage of the server 
 Client can send TFTP file to the server and the server can read the information in the 
received file. 
 Inside interface will inspect outgoing traffic and outside interface will allow return 
traffic initiated by the client 
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 Other requests from inside network to outside and request from outside to inside net-
work will be denied. 
 
To understand how the CBAC works, I also divide this part into three processes: before con-
figuring the CBAC, before configuring the inspecting rules and after configuring the inspect-
ing rules.  
 
 Before configuring the CBAC 
Before configure the ACLs, as I mention in the baseline test, I test the ICMP traffic by ping 
method, UDP traffic by tftp file transfer and TCP traffic by using web request. They all work 
well from inside network towards outside network and vice versa. 
 
 Creating ACLs without Inspection Rules 
To allow client in the inside network to send web page requests and to transfer tftp files as 
well as to ping other hosts, I use the configuration command below: 
CBAC (config)# access-list 101 permit tcp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
CBAC (config)# access-list 101 permit udp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
CBAC (config)# access-list 101 permit icmp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
CBAC (config)# access-list 101 deny ip any any 
 
Then I apply those rules on the inside interface with the inbound direction, so all those three 
requests are allowed to go out this interface and other undefined traffic will be blocked. 
CBAC (config)# int gigabitethernet 0/2 
CBAC (config)# ip access-group 101 in  
 
To only allow the icmp traffic to return from outside and deny all the other traffic from out-
side, I use the command below: 
CBAC (config)# access-list 102 permit icmp any any echo-reply 
CBAC (config)# access-list 102 permit icmp any any unreachable 
CBAC (config)# access-list 102 permit icmp any any time-exceeded 
CBAC (config)# access-list 102 deny ip any any  
 
Then I apply those ACLs rules on outside interface with the inbound direction.  
CBAC (config)# int gigabitethernet 0/1 
CBAC (config)# ip access-group 102 in 
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Then I test the icmp traffic and web services as well as tftp file transfer services before I apply 
the inspection rules. 
 
Pinging from the server to the client is failed because of the deny ip any any command. How-
ever, ping from the client to the server is allowed because of the command permit icmp any 
any echo-reply. For the tcp traffic test, requests on webpage at either the client computer or 
the server computer are not allowed. For the file transfer, the file can be transferred via the 
UDP 69 port but the contents of the text file are invisible. 
 
 Adding Inspection Rules 
In order to let the returning tcp and udp traffic back to inside network, I add the commands as 
Figure 19 shows. 
 
 
Figure 19 Commands on Inspection 
 
Ping from the client to the server is still allowed and from the server to the client is still de-
nied. The web request from the server to the client is continuously denied while the web re-
quest from the client to the server is allowed this time. For the TFTP file transfer, even I in-
spect the UDP traffic; the content of the text file received by the TFTP server is still invisible 
until I apply inspection rules on the tftp traffic.  
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After I ensure those fundamental ACLs works, I reconfigure the router and add 300 lines of 
unless ACL statements before the valid ACL statements. Then I test the network performance 
to see whether length of the ACLs affect the network bandwidth. 
 
5.2.1 Network Latency and Packet Lost Rate 
 
The testing method on network latency and packet lost rate is same as that I use in the baseline 
environment. The results are showed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Latency and Packet Lost Rate in Router with Firewall 
 
5.2.2 Bandwidth 
 
Table 7 shows TCP bandwidth when I use 1 Mbytes buffer length, 32 Kbytes in window size 
and 1500 Kbytes in max segment size. I test in 30 seconds and 5 times. 
 
Table 7 TCP Bandwidth in Router with Firewall 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Bandwidth 
(Kbits/sec) 
83600 83538 83686 84139 84199 83832.4 
 
5.3 Firewall implemented with Proxy Server (SmoothWall) 
 
SmoothWall is a Linux-based open source firewall and easy to use because of friendly web-
based GUI. In this section I will use SmoothWall as proxy server to filter traffic. Figure 20 
shows the topology of the network. At this part, I use the third computer to install and to run 
the SmoothWall. In the installation, Green interface is configured with IP address 
192.168.2.1/24 while the red one is set with IP address 192.168.1.1/24. They just like inside 
Packet size 
(Bytes) 
Number of 
Requests 
Lost Min (ms) Max (ms) Average (ms) 
32 500 0 (0%) 0 0.8 0 
35000 500 1.4 (0%) 7 9.8 7 
65000 500 2.6 (0%) 13 54.2 13 
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and outside interface I use in previous scenarios. Client and Server configurations are same as 
before.  
 
Figure 20 SmoothWall Topology 
 
5.3.1 Network Performance with Default settings of SmoothWall 
 
After I create the simple network, I simply test the traffic control between inside network and 
outside network. By default, traffic inside can go outside while the opposite traffic is denied. I 
can successfully ping from client to server but fail on pinging from server to client. Similarly 
to the TCP traffic, web request from client to server works but the other way around does not 
work well. For UDP traffic, TFTP server can receive the text file but fail to read the infor-
mation in the text file.  
 
Then I use the same measurement method to measure the network latency and bandwidth be-
fore I add any rules. Table 8 shows latency and packet lost rate when the Smoothwall is con-
figured with default settings. By comparing Table 8 and Table 6, using SmoothWall will 
cause bigger latency when compared with IOS Firewall. But using SmoothWall is more relia-
ble as the packet lost rate is smaller.  
 
Table 8 Latency and Packet Lost in Default SmoothWall 
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Table 9 shows the results of the TCP bandwidth. Comparing Table 9 and Table 7, TCP band-
width in network with default SmoothWall decreases a little bit. In a word, it shows Smooth-
Wall reduces the throughput.  
 
Table 9 TCP Bandwidth in Default SmoothWall 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Bandwidth(Kbits/sec) 83087 82938 82938 83064 83044 83014.2 
 
5.3.2 Network Performance after adding rules 
 
In this part, I test whether length of rules added in the SmoothWall will affect the network 
performance. Before adding those rules, I first try to configure some rules to test how the 
SmoothWall controls traffic. And I find tftp traffic does not work as I expected. Take the 
TFTP file transfer as an example, by default the client on inside network sends the text file 
and the server can receive it but cannot read its content. As a result, I individually allow the 
client computer to use UDP port 69 to successfully send the text file. Figure 21 shows traffic 
sent by the inside client via port 69 (for TFTP file transfer) is allowed to go outside. However, 
this still does not help the server read the received text. 
 
Packet size 
(Bytes) 
Number of 
Requests 
Lost Min (ms) Max (ms) Average (ms) 
32 500 0 (0%) 0 0.4 0 
35000 500 0.4 (0%) 13 14.4 13 
65000 500 0 (0%) 23.8 31.4 24 
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Figure 21 Allow Outing Traffic via Port 69 Service 
 
In order to successfully transfer text file between two networks, I change the mode of the 
TFTP server and TFTP client. Server computer on the outside network is switched to TFTP 
client mode while the Client computer on inside network is changed to be a TFTP sever. Then 
I decide to let outside sever send TFTP file to inside client.  
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Figure 22 Incoming Traffic Control  
 
Figure 22 shows how I configure the incoming traffic to enable the server to send the file to 
the client. After I apply this rule, normally we would expect that TFTP sever (at inside net-
work) can successfully receive the text and read its data. But it does not like that. The TFTP 
client can receive the text file but cannot read the data. The data is readable only I add a rule 
which allows client computer to access the outgoing service.  
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Figure 23 Outing Traffic Control 
 
Figure 23 shows I only add a rule allowing client computer (run as TFTP server) to access 
outside service. Without this rules, the text file can be received but cannot be readable. This is 
a little different thing when I test tftp traffic with SmoothWall. Compared with Cisco IOS 
Firewall, Smoothwall seems more friendly and easier to use. However, some functions are 
limited and at least the TFTP service is not that easy to understand and configure correctly. 
 
To test whether length of rules affects SmoothWall performance, I add around 300 IP Block 
rules. Table 10 shows the network latency and packet lost rate. Compared Table 8 and Table 
10, there is no much differences on latency between default SmoothWall and SmoothWall 
with rules. However, the packet lost rate is bigger when more rules are configured. In addi-
tion, the average maximum latency is also bigger when add more rules even those rules are 
useless.  
 
Table 10 Network Latency and Packet Lost Rate in SmoothWall with 300 Rules 
 
Table 11 shows that the TCP bandwidth is around 83073.8 when rules are configured and this 
value is a little higher according to Table 9 when the network is with default SmootWall. This 
result is not expected when more rules are added. My guess here is 300 rules are not enough to 
affect the bandwidth performance when the memory of SmoothWall is big. 
 
Table 11 TCP Bandwidth in SmoothWall with 300 Rules 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Bandwidth(Kbits/sec) 83001 83130 83001 83173 83064 83073.8 
 
5.4 SmoothWall inside a Router 
 
Packet size 
(Bytes) 
Number of 
Requests 
Lost Min (ms) Max (ms) Average (ms) 
32 500 0 (0%) 0 2.2 0 
35000 500 1.2 (0%) 13 13.2 13 
65000 500 0.2 (0%) 24 32.4 24 
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As SmoothWall is dedicated as firewall and normally companies may not directly connect it 
to the Internet. If they do like this, SmoothWall performance may be affected when it works 
for routing and firewall issues. Before I have implemented router intergrated with CBAC 
feature, now i will also implemnet a network integrated a SmoothWall inside a router. For the 
SmoothWall inside the router, the router focuses on routing and SmoothWall act as firewall. 
Then I would like to figure out pefromance differences between router with firewall features 
and Smoothwall inside a router. 
 
 
Figure 24 SmoothWall inside a Router  
 
Figure 24 shows the netowork topology I use for the SmoothWall inside the router. The 
setting on Green side are not changed and Just connect the Red interface on the SmoothWall 
via port GE0/1 of the router and port GE0/2 of the router is connected to server compoter. IP 
address of GE0/1 is 192.168.1.2/24 while IP address of GE0/2 is 192.168.3.1/24. Server IP 
address is 192.168.3.2/24. 
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Figure 25 SmoothWall Interfaces Configuration 
 
The configuration is quite simple, I just firstly configure interfaces of the router. Then 
SmoothWall Default Gateway is assigned with IP address of GE0/1 on router as this port 
connects the red interface of the SmoothWall. You can see the interaces I configure for the 
SmoothWall. To test the connectity, I ping from inside to outside server, send web request to 
the server. After all are successfull, I start to test the latency, the packet lost rate and the TCP 
bandwidth. 
 
5.4.1 Network Performance for SmoothWall Inside Router 
 
Comparing Table 10 and Table 12, there is no much differences in delay and packet lost rate. 
Except few small-size and medium-size packets have longer delay when after i add router 
before the SmoothWall connects to the outside network. 
   
Table 12 Latency and Packet Lost for SmoothWall Inside Router 
Packet size 
(Bytes) 
Number of 
Requests 
Lost Min (ms) Max (ms) Average (ms) 
32 500 0 (0%) 0  3 0 
35000 500 0 (0%) 13 16.8 13 
65000 500 0.2 (0%) 24 28.8 24 
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From Table 13 and Table 11 we can notice that bandwidth decrease a little bit when a router is 
added. 
 
Table 13 TCP Bandwidth for SmoothWall Inside Router 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Bandwidth(Kbits/sec) 82638 82681 82617 82403 82596 82587 
 
5.5 Comparisons and Summaries 
 
This section is mainly about making conclusion according to the outcomes of the practical 
work and giving some suggestions on how to choose a firewall solution. I should point out 
that, to test the security level of the firewall performance is not included in my final thesis. 
 
Table 14 Latency and Packet Lost Rate in medium and bigger packet size 
  Packet size (35000 Bytes) 
Router with IOS Firewall 1.4 (0%) 9.8 7 
SmoothWall with rules 1.2 (0%) 13.2 13 
SmoothWall inside a rout-
er 
0 (0%) 16.8 13 
Packet size (65000 Bytes) 
Router with IOS Firewall 2.6 (0%) 54.2 13 
SmoothWall with rules 0.2 (0%) 32.4 24 
SmoothWall inside a rout-
er 
0.2 (0%) 28.8 24 
 
For convenience, I put all the data together and analyze them. Table 14 shows latency and 
packet lost in different tests. As there is no big difference when the packet size is small, I just 
use the medium and big packet size. I will mainly compare cases on router with IOS firewall 
and SmootWall inside a router. The former could be seen as integrated firewall while the later 
one is dedicated firewall with combination of router. Both have firewall and routing capabili-
ties. Generally, delay will increase for all situations when packet size grows. 
 
Basically, difference on latency and packet lost rate is not that obvious when packet size is 
small. When go to the medium packet size, router with CBAC firewall features has smaller 
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delay than network with SmoothWall inside a router. However, we can see that using 
SmoothWall alone and using SmoothWall with router, packets are less likely to get lost when 
comparing with router with IOS firewall. For bigger packet size, SmoothWall inside a router 
still ensures lower packet lost rate but takes longer RTT. A little different thing is maximum 
RTT for few individual packets are lower. 
 
Table 15 Comparison of the TCP bandwidth 
Case Bandwidth (Kbits/sec) Percentage 
Router without Firewall 84348 NO 
Router with IOS Firewall 83832.4 99.39% 
SmoothWall with rules 83073.8 NO 
SmoothWall inside a router 82587 99.41% 
 
Table 15 shows the TCP bandwidth among different tests. When a router is configured with 
CBAC firewall feature, the network bandwidth decreases a little bit. Similar to SmoothWall, 
when combine it with a router, TCP bandwidth degrades. Network bandwidth is higher when 
implementing IOS firewall than that with SmoothWall. When a router is configured with 
firewall feature, bandwidth is 99.39% of router without firewall. For SmoothWall inside a 
router, the bandwidth is 99.41% of network only uses SmoothWall. With same number of 
rules, it seems that router with CBAC firewall feature reduces more bandwidth but the overall 
bandwidth is still more than the case SmoothWall inside a router. 
 
My aim of final thesis is to finding the answer on should a company choose a dedicated fire-
wall like SmoothWall or an integrated firewall like Cisco Router configured with firewall 
features. To answer this question, I compare network performances on different cases and 
mainly focus on Cisco Router with CBAC and SmoothWall Express 3.0 combined with a 
router. I also test TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic by default mode before I add rules in both tests. 
 
Using dedicated SmoothWall, network has bigger delay and lower TCP bandwidth. However, 
packets are less likely to get lost when SmoothWall is implemented. Another good point is 
that the software is free and all you need is a supportive hardware with Pentium class CPU or 
a better one. Installation of the SmoothWall is also quite easy because of the straightforward 
guide. For firewall configurations, except the tftp traffic control I test, SmootWall is generally 
easy to use. It is more friendly use especially for people who do not have enough network 
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knowledge. This is because web-based graphic user interface is simple and people can under-
stand easily. Cisco IOS firewall configuration needs person have prerequisites on the ACL 
rules and how to troubleshooting. 
 
Functions of SmoothWall are somehow limited when I check the panel. For example, object-
based port rules are not contained. This may be not that convenient when we want to control 
traffic on special group. For IP block rules, it can block outside hosts specified with source IP 
addresses or source networks. It does not contain access limitation on the specified destination 
hosts or a specified network. If we want to only outside host to access resources on one inside 
host and allow it to access other resources, this is not that convenient and maybe time-
consuming. This is because we have to add rules in the incoming panel to add IP address of 
the each allowed hosts. When there are many of those addresses and without object rules, con-
figuration will be not that easy.  
 
We choose a firewall solution we can take the following things into consideration. For exam-
ple, companies own needs, cost, network performance parameters, provided firewall features, 
whether easy to configure and supported hardware for the firewall. SmoothWall is suitable for 
a smaller company who wants to save cost and do not need too many advanced firewall fea-
tures. It is also good for a company who do not have an IT professional and bandwidth is not a 
big issue. It is also a good choice for a company who needs smaller packet lost rate to get reli-
able data transmission.  
 
For Cisco Router, it focuses on routing issues but the firewall features can be configured. If a 
company needs overall higher bandwidth and assumes that the packet lost as well as latency 
are a minor issues, the company is better to choose IOS firewall. Company needing more ad-
vanced firewall features is suggested to choose router. This will also require the company has 
professional IT experts to know how to configure those features and how to troubleshooting.  
 
There are also other dedicated firewall products like Cisco ASA, it has more advanced fire-
wall functions. I would like to test its performance in the future if I have time. Then more 
suggestions could be given for a company who wants to use other kinds dedicated firewall. 
For my future work, I am also interested in figuring out how complexity of rules configured 
affect the firewall performance. In addition, firewalls with DMZ are also interesting to explore 
in deep. 
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To make a conclusion, it is very interesting to do the projects and I learn many things not only 
firewall theory knowledge but also how to manage a project and time. How to plan and im-
plement the project are also practical benefits in the whole process.  
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APPENDIX  
Appendix 1- Configurations on CBAC 
CBAC#show run 
CBAC#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 17472 bytes 
! 
version 15.2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname CBAC 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
! 
! 
no aaa new-model 
! 
! 
no ipv6 cef 
ip auth-proxy max-login-attempts 5 
ip admission max-login-attempts 5 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
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ip inspect name CBAC-FW tcp 
ip inspect name CBAC-FW udp 
ip inspect name CBAC-FW tftp 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
! 
! 
! 
license udi pid CISCO2911/K9 sn FCZ153720T8 
! 
! 
! 
redundancy 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-Engine0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
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 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
 ip access-group 102 in 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
 ip access-group 101 in 
 ip inspect CBAC-FW in 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
interface Serial0/1/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
interface Serial0/1/1 
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 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
! 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.1 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.2 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.3 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.4 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.5 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.6 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.7 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.8 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.9 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.10 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.11 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.12 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.13 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.14 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.15 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.16 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.17 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.18 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.19 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.20 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.21 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.22 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.23 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.24 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.25 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.26 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.27 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.28 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.29 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.30 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.31 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.32 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.33 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.34 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.35 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.36 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.37 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.38 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.39 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.40 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.41 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.42 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.43 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.44 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.45 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.46 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.47 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.48 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.49 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.50 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.51 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.52 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.53 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.54 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.55 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.56 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.57 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.58 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.59 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.60 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.61 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.62 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.63 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.64 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.65 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.66 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.67 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.68 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.69 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.70 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.71 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.72 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.73 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.74 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.75 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.76 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.77 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.78 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.79 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.80 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.81 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.82 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.83 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.84 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.85 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.86 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.87 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.88 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.89 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.90 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.91 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.92 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.93 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.94 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.95 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.96 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.97 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.98 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.99 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.100 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.101 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.102 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.103 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.104 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.105 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.106 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.107 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.108 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.109 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.110 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.111 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.112 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.113 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.114 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.115 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.116 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.117 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.118 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.119 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.120 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.121 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.122 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.123 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.124 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.125 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.126 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.127 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.128 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.129 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.130 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.131 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.132 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.133 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.134 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.135 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.136 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.137 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.138 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.139 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.140 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.141 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.142 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.143 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.144 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.145 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.146 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.147 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.148 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.149 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.150 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.151 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.152 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.153 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.154 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.155 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.156 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.157 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.158 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.159 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.160 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.161 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.162 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.163 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.164 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.165 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.166 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.167 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.168 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.169 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.170 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.171 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.172 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.173 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.174 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.175 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.176 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.177 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.178 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.179 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.180 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.181 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.182 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.183 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.184 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.185 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.186 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.187 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.188 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.189 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.190 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.191 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.192 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.193 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.194 any 
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access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.195 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.196 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.197 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.198 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.199 any 
access-list 101 deny   tcp host 172.16.1.200 any 
access-list 101 permit icmp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 101 permit tcp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 101 permit udp 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.1 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.2 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.3 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.4 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.5 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.6 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.7 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.8 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.9 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.10 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.11 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.12 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.13 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.14 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.15 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.16 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.17 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.18 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.19 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.20 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.21 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.22 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.23 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.24 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.25 any echo-reply 
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access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.26 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.27 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.28 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.29 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.30 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.31 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.32 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.33 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.34 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.35 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.36 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.37 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.38 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.39 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.40 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.41 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.42 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.43 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.44 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.45 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.46 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.47 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.48 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.49 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.50 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.51 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.52 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.53 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.54 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.55 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.56 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.57 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.58 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.59 any echo-reply 
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access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.60 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.61 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.62 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.63 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.64 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.65 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.66 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.67 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.68 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.69 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.70 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.71 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.72 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.73 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.74 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.75 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.76 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.77 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.78 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.79 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.80 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.81 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.82 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.83 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.84 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.85 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.86 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.87 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.88 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.89 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.90 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.91 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.92 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.93 any echo-reply 
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access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.94 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.95 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.96 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.97 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.98 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.99 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 deny   icmp host 10.10.10.100 any echo-reply 
access-list 102 permit icmp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any echo-reply 
! 
! 
! 
control-plane 
! 
! 
! 
line con 0 
line aux 0 
line 2 
 no activation-character 
 no exec 
 transport preferred none 
 transport input all 
 transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v120 ssh 
 stopbits 1 
line vty 0 4 
 login 
 transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
CBAC# 
